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Abstract. Descriptor revision by Hansson is a framework for addressing
the problem of belief change. In descriptor revision, different kinds of
change processes are dealt with in a joint framework. Individual change
requirements are qualified by specific success conditions expressed by a
belief descriptor, and belief descriptors can be combined by logical con-
nectives. This is in contrast to the currently dominating AGM paradigm
shaped by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson, where different kinds
of changes, like a revision or a contraction, are dealt with separately.
In this article, we investigate the realisation of descriptor revision for a
conditional logic while restricting descriptors to the conjunction of literal
descriptors. We apply the principle of conditional preservation developed
by Kern-Isberner to descriptor revision for conditionals, show how descrip-
tor revision for conditionals under these restrictions can be characterised
by a constraint satisfaction problem, and implement it using constraint
logic programming. Since our conditional logic subsumes propositional
logic, our approach also realises descriptor revision for propositional logic.
1 Introduction
The approach to belief change by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson (AGM)
and its successors are currently the dominating paradigm for belief change. In this
theory, three main kinds of belief changes are subject of interest: revision (incor-
porating new beliefs into an agent’s belief state while maintaining consistency),
contraction (removing beliefs from the agent’s belief state), and expansion (incor-
porating new beliefs into an agent’s belief state without maintaining consistency).
The most prominent difference between these kinds of changes is their success
condition. The overall approach to the problem of belief change by AGM is top-
down, starting from the axiomatisation of each of the three kinds of changes and
then investigating the representational issues through representation theorems.
In the last 20 years, the AGM theory has been extended into several directions
and has been deeply investigated. This gives new insights on the requirements of
representation and conceptual problems of (AGM) belief change. In particular, for
Hansson [16], the requirement of epistemic states for iterative belief change [8], the
central role of conditionals in belief change and non-monotonic logic [24, 25] and
problems like the non-finite representability of the result of a contraction [14] or
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concerns about the “select-and-intersect” approach of AGM [16] were a motivation
to design a new framework for belief change. Descriptor revision by Hansson [10]
follows the top-down approach to belief change, but, in contrast to the AGM
paradigm, in descriptor revision, different kinds of changes are expressible in one
joint framework. For this, Hansson introduced a language for success conditions,
called belief descriptors, implying that the success condition of a change is not
implicitly hidden in the kind of operation, but an explicit part of the change
process. This allows to express and analyse change processes that go beyond the
classical AGM operations, e.g., a change process where a contraction of a belief
α and a revision by β appear at the same time. Descriptor revision has been
broadly investigated by Hansson [11–16], but did not gain as much attention as
AGM [27]. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, until now, no approach to
the realisation of descriptor revision is available.
In this article, we investigate descriptor revision for a conditional logic while
using ordinal conditional functions [26], also called ranking functions, as rep-
resentation for epistemic states. We outline how to instantiate the framework
of descriptor revision for this logic and design an approach for its realisation.
Furthermore, for descriptor revision we use and adapt the sophisticated principle
of conditional preservation by Kern-Isberner [17, 18] for ranking functions. In
summary, the main contributions of this article are:
– Introduction of conditional descriptor revision, which introduces the principle
of conditional preservation to the framework of descriptor revision.
– A sound and complete characterisation of conditional descriptor revision for
elementary descriptors by a constraint satisfaction problem.
– Implementation of elementary descriptor revision using constraint logic pro-
gramming and by employing the developed characterisation.
The article is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present logical preliminaries.
We recall descriptors and descriptor revision in Section 3. Section 4 introduces our
framework of conditional descriptor revision. Section 5 develops a characterisation
of conditional descriptor revision for elementary descriptors by a constraint
satisfaction problem. The implementation of this approach is sketched in Section
6. We conclude and point out future work in Section 7.
2 Logical Preliminaries
Let Σ be a propositional signature (non empty finite set of propositional variables)
and Lprop the propositional language over Σ. With upper case letters A,B,C, . . .,
we denote formulas in Lprop and with lower case letters a, b, c, . . . propositional
variables from Σ. We allow the typical abbreviation A→ B for ¬A∨B, abbreviate
A∧B by AB and write A for ¬A. With>, we denote a propositional tautology and
with ⊥ a propositional falsum. The set of propositional interpretations Ω = P(Σ),
also called set of worlds, is identified with the set of corresponding complete
conjunctions overΣ, where P(·) is the powerset operator. Propositional entailment
is denoted by |=, the set of models of A with Mod(A), and Cn(A) = {B | A |= B}
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is the deductive closure of A. For a set X, we define Cn(X) = {B | X |= B}
and say X is deductively closed if X = Cn(X). In the context of belief change, a
deductively closed set is also called a belief set.
A function κ : Ω → N such that κ−1(0) 6= ∅ is a called a ordinal conditional
function (OCF), also called a ranking function [26]. It expresses degrees of
plausibility of interpretations. This is lifted to propositional formulas A by
specifying degrees of disbelief. More formally, we have κ(A) := min{κ(ω) | ω |=
A}, so that κ(A ∨ B) = min{κ(A), κ(B)}. With Mod(κ) = {ω | κ(ω) = 0}, we
denote the minimal interpretations with respect to κ, and Bel (κ) denotes the
theory of propositional formulas that hold in all ω ∈ Mod(κ).
Over Σ and Lprop, we define the set of conditionals Lcond = {(B|A) | A,B ∈
L}. A conditional (B|A) formalizes “if A then usually B” and establishes a
plausible connection between the antecedent A and the consequent B. Conditionals
with tautological antecedents are taken as plausible statements about the world.
Because conditionals go well beyond classical logic, they require a richer setting
for their semantics than classical logic. Following De Finetti [9], a conditional
(B|A) can be verified (falsified) by a possible world ω iff ω |= AB (ω |= AB). If
ω 6|= A, then we say the conditional is not applicable to ω.
Ranking functions serve here as interpretations in a model theory for a
conditional logic. We say a conditional (B|A) is accepted in a ranking function
κ, written as κ |= (B|A), iff κ(AB) < κ(AB), i.e., iff the verification AB of
the conditional is more plausible than its falsification AB. For a propositional
formula A, we define κ |= A if κ |= (A|>), i.e., iff κ(A) < κ(A) or iff κ(A) > 0,
since at least one of κ(A), κ(A) must be 0 due to κ−1(0) 6= ∅. The models
of a conditional (B|A) are the set of all ranking functions accepting (B|A), i.e.
Mod((B1|A1)) = {κ | κ |= (B|A)}. A conditional (B1|A1) entails (B2|A2), written
(B1|A1) |= (B2|A2), if Mod((B1|A1)) ⊆ Mod((B2|A2)) holds. Furthermore, we
define the set of consequences for X ⊆ Lcond by Cn(X) = {(B|A) | X |= (B|A)}.
As usual, X ⊆ Lcond is called deductively closed if X = Cn(X). This ranking
function based semantics can be mapped to, and can also be obtained from, other
semantics of conditionals [4].
Example 1 (adapted [5]). Let Σ = {p, b, f} with p meaning “penguin”, b “bird”
and f “able to fly”. “Birds normally fly” is modelled with the conditional r1 = (f |b),
“penguins normally do not fly” with r2 = (f |p), and “penguins are normally birds”
with r3 = (b|p). Consider the ranking function κp from Table 1, which will act as
our running example for the following sections (where we will also elaborate the
other ranking function and conditionals shown in Table 1). Table 1 also contains
the verifying and falsifying interpretations of the conditional (f |p). The ranking
function κp accepts all conditionals in Rpen = {r1, r2, r3}, i.e. κp |= ri for all
1 6 i 6 3. For example, κ |= r1 because κ(bf) = 0 < 1 = κ(bf) holds. Sure, after
reading a lot of papers from knowledge representation, the ranking function κp is
the only viable belief state representing beliefs about penguins, flying and birds
for an agent.
3
conditionals belief states
ω (p|b) (f |p) (f |p) κp(ω) κ◦p(ω)
b f p v v f 2 1
b f p f 0 2
b f p v f v 1 1
b f p f 1 3
bf p v f 4 3
bf p 0 0
b f p f v 2 2
b f p 0 0
Table 1. Verifying (v) and falsifying (f) interpretations for the conditionals (p|b), (f |p),
and (f |p), and the ranking functions for the running penguin example.
3 Descriptors and Descriptor Revision
The main building blocks of descriptor revision are belief descriptors, which
provide a language for expressing membership constraints for a belief set.
Definition 1 (Descriptor [15]). Let L be a logical language. For any sentence
ϕ ∈ L the expression Bϕ is an atomic descriptor (over L). Any connection
of atomic descriptors with disjunction, conjunction and negation is called a
molecular descriptor (over L). A composite descriptor (over L) is a set of
molecular descriptors (over L).
Like Hansson [15], we simplify notions by denoting composite descriptors just
as descriptors. We also call a molecular descriptor of the form Bϕ or ¬Bϕ literal
descriptor. An elementary descriptor is a set of literal descriptors.
Definition 2 (Descriptor semantics [15]). An atomic descriptor Bϕ holds
in a belief set X, written X  Bϕ, if ϕ ∈ X. This is lifted to molecular descriptors
truth-functionally. A descriptor Ψ holds in X, likewise written X  Ψ , if X  α
holds for every molecular descriptor α ∈ Ψ .
For an example of descriptors, consider the following example.
Example 2. Assume that Lab is the propositional language over Σ = {a, b} and
X = Cn(a∨ b). Then, ¬Ba expresses that a is not part of the belief set, whereas
B¬a states that the formula ¬a is part of the belief set, e.g. X  ¬Ba and
X 6 B¬a. Likewise, Ba ∨Bb expresses that a or b is believed, whereas B(a ∨ b)
states that the formula a ∨ b is believed, e.g. X  B(a ∨ b) and X 6 Ba ∨Bb.
For the setting of belief change, we assume that every agent is equipped with
a belief state, also called epistemic state, which contains all information necessary
for maintaining her belief apparatus. We denote belief states by K,K1,K2, . . .
following the notion of Hansson [15]. General descriptor revision does not specify
what a belief state is, but assumes that a belief set Bel (K) is immanent for
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every epistemic state K. To make descriptors compatible with belief states, we
naturally lift the semantics to belief states, i.e. K  Ψ if Bel (K)  Ψ .
Example 3 (continued). Assume ranking functions as a representation of belief
states. Let κp be the belief state from Table 1 and let Ψ = {Bp, Bbf, ¬Bbf}
be an elementary descriptor. The descriptor Ψ expresses belief in p (it is not a
penguin) and bf (it is a flying bird) and not believing bf (it is a non-flying bird).
The immanent belief set of κp is Bel (κp) = Cn(p ∧ (b→ f)). The descriptor Ψ
holds in κp, i.e. κp  Ψ , since p ∈ Bel (κp), bf ∈ Bel (κp) and bf /∈ Bel (κp).
AGM theory [1] focuses on properties of revision (or contraction) operations
by examining the interconnection between prior belief state, new information and
posterior belief state of a change. Descriptor revision examines the interconnection
between prior belief state and posterior belief states that satisfy a particular
descriptor. Let KK denote the set of all reasonable conceivable successor belief
states for a belief state K. A descriptor revision by a descriptor Ψ is the process
of choosing a state K ′ from KK such that K ′  Ψ . We abstract from the internal
process of how KK is obtained and define descriptor revision1 as follows.
Definition 3 (Descriptor Revision, adapted [15]). Let K be a belief state,
KK a set of belief states and C : P(KK)→ KK be a choice function. Then the
change from K to K◦ = K ◦ Ψ is called a descriptor revision by Ψ realised by C
over KK if the following holds:
K ◦ Ψ = C( {K ′ ∈ KK | K ′  Ψ} ), (1)
We say that the change from K to K◦ is a descriptor revision (by Ψ), if C and
KK (and Ψ) exist such that the change from K to K◦ is realised by C over KK .
We also say K◦ is the result of the descriptor revision of K (by Ψ under KK).
Descriptors allow to express a variety of different success conditions, e.g.
{Bϕ} Revision by ϕ
{¬Bϕ} Contraction by ϕ (also called revocation [16])
{¬Bϕ,¬B¬ϕ} Giving up the judgement on ϕ (also called ignoration [5])
Additionally, Hansson provides the following examples [16]:
{Bϕ1, . . . ,Bϕn} Package revision by {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}
{¬Bϕ,Bψ} Replacement of ϕ by ψ
{Bϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨Bϕn} Choice revision by {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}
{Bϕ ∨B¬ϕ} Making up one’s mind about ϕ
Note that all given examples, except for choice revision and “making up one’s
mind”, are elementary descriptors. In particular, elementary descriptor revision
subsumes operations of AGM, and, furthermore, also allows to express changes
which lead to a revision and a contraction at the same time. For a concrete
example, we continue our running example.
1 In the original framework by Hansson this is much more elaborated. By the terminol-
ogy of Hansson, here we present a form of local deterministic monoselective descriptor
revision [15]. Moreover, we primarily focus on one change, while Hansson designs the
framework for change operators.
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Example 4 (continued). Let κp and κ◦p be as in Table 1, let Kκp be the set of all
ranking functions, let C be a choice function such that C(X) = κ◦p if κ◦p ∈ X, and
let Ψ = {Bb ∨Bp, ¬Bbf} be a descriptor. The descriptor Ψ expresses posterior
belief in b or belief in p and disbelief in bf . In particular, ¬Bbf expresses a
contraction with bf (it is a flying bird), but for Bb ∨Bp (it is not a bird or it
is a penguin), there is no straight counterpart in the AGM framework. Note
that we have Bel
(
κ◦p
)
= Cn(b ∧ p), and thus, it holds that b ∈ Bel (κ◦p) and
bf /∈ Bel (κ◦p), and therefore, the descriptor Ψ holds in κ◦p. Thus, the change from
κp to κ◦p is a descriptor revision by Ψ realised by C over Kκp .
4 Conditional Descriptor Revision
We instantiate descriptor revision for the case in which the underlying logic is
the conditional logic Lcond and ranking functions serve as a representation for
epistemic states. Furthermore, we adapt the principle of conditional preservation
by Kern-Isberner [18] to the requirements of descriptor revision.
4.1 Adaptions for Conditionals in Lcond
In the formal framework of descriptor revision by Hansson, as recalled in Section 3,
semantics of a descriptor refer to a belief set, containing formulas of the underlying
logic. Thus, when using the advanced logic Lcond, we need to refer to the set of
conditionals accepted by a ranking function κ when choosing ranking functions as
representations for epistemic states. However, the belief set Bel (κ) of a ranking
function κ is a set of propositional beliefs, i.e. Bel (κ) ⊆ Lprop. We define the set
of conditional beliefs for a ranking function κ as follows:
Belcond (κ) = { (B|A) | κ |= (B|A) }
Clearly, the set Belcond (κ) is a deductively closed set for every ranking function
κ and therefore a belief set. Descriptors and descriptor revision for Lcond then
refer to the set of conditional beliefs Belcond (κ), and their formal definition can
be easily obtained by correspondingly modifying Definitions 1 to 3.
Note that the conditional logic Lcond embeds the propositional logic Lprop,
hence every proposition A ∈ Lprop can be represented by (A|>). Moreover,
the definition of Belcond (κ) ensures compatibility of propositional beliefs with
the conditional beliefs, i.e. {(A|>) | A ∈ Bel (K)} ⊆ Belcond (K). Thus, our ap-
proach to descriptor revision by conditionals, presented in the following, subsumes
descriptor revision for propositions.
4.2 Conditional Preservation
When an agent performs a belief change, the change might not only affect explicit
beliefs, but also implicit beliefs. Boutilier proposed that belief change should
also minimize the effect on conditional beliefs [6]. Kern-Isberner introduced the
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principle of conditional preservation (PCP) and gave a thorough axiomatisation
of PCP [17,18] in a very general manner.
Note that the principle of conditional preservation is usually defined as a
property of a change by a set of conditionalsR. However, when having a descriptor
revision, the underlying change framework and its parameters and capabilities
might be hidden. Thus, we abstract from the assumption that the change is
done by a set of conditionals R, and just state that a change satisfies PCP with
respect to a set of conditionals R. This allows us to say that a change satisfies
the principle of conditional preservation without assuming the involvement of
specific parameters in the underlying change framework. In the following, we
present our relaxed variant of the principle of conditional preservation for the
special case of ranking functions.
Definition 4 (PCP for OCF changes, adapted [21]). A change of a ranking
function κ to a ranking function κ◦ fulfils the principle of conditional preservation
with respect to the conditionals R = {(B1|A1), . . . , (Bn|An)}, if for every two mul-
tisets of propositional interpretations Ω1 = {ω1, . . . , ωm} and Ω2 = {ω′1, . . . , ω′m}
with the same cardinality m such that the multisets Ω1 and Ω2 contain the
same number of interpretations which verify, respectively falsify, each conditional
(Bi|Ai) in R, the ranking functions κ and κ◦ are balanced in the following way:
m∑
i=1
κ(ωi)−
m∑
i=1
κ(ω′i) =
m∑
i=1
κ◦(ωi)−
m∑
i=1
κ◦(ω′i) (2)
Example 5 (continued). Assume our agent has moved to Antarctica and she
starts to question her beliefs about penguins and birds. The only birds she sees
in Antarctica are penguins, and moreover, she observes, trough her window, a
lot of penguins jumping off a cliff, and thus, flying for a moment. Her belief
state is changing from κp to κ◦p from Table 1. Consider now the conditional
(p|b) expressing that birds are usually penguins, the conditional (f |p) expressing
that penguins usually fly, and the conditional (f |p) expressing that penguins
usually don’t fly. The change from κp to κ◦p satisfies the principle of conditional
preservation with respect to the conditionals in R = {(p|b), (f |p), (f |p)}. For
instance, the two multisets Ω1 = {bfp, b fp} and Ω2 = {bfp, bfp}, containing for
every conditional in R the same number of verifying and falsifying worlds, and
their values under κp and κ◦p are balanced according to Equation (2), i.e.
κp(bfp) + κp(b fp)− κp(bfp)− κp(bfp) = 2 + 2− 1− 4 = −1
= 1 + 2− 1− 3 = κ◦p(bfp) + κ◦p(b fp)− κ◦p(bfp)− κ◦p(bfp).
The definition of the principle of conditional preservation, as given in Definition
4, does not require information about the success condition of a change. Thus,
the notion of the principle of conditional preservation is directly available for
descriptor revision of conditionals when we provide a set of conditionals. A natural
choice are the conditionals appearing in a descriptor Ψ . For a descriptor Ψ over
Lcond, we define the set of conditionals in Ψ , denoted by cond(Ψ), as follows:
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– for Ψ = ∅ let cond(Ψ) = ∅,
– for Ψ = {B(B|A)} let cond(Ψ) = {(B|A)},
– for Ψ = {α, β, . . .} let cond(Ψ) = cond({α}) ∪ cond({β, . . .}),
– for Ψ = {α ∨ β} let cond(Ψ) = cond({α}) ∪ cond({β}),
– for Ψ = {α ∧ β} let cond(Ψ) = cond({α}) ∪ cond({β}), and
– for Ψ = {¬α} let cond(Ψ) = cond({α}).
In the following, we use a central characterisation [20,21] of the principle of
conditional preservation to obtain a characterisation of the principle of conditional
preservation for descriptor revisions.
Proposition 1 (PCP for Descriptor Revision, adapted [21]). Let Ψ be
a descriptor over Lcond and cond(Ψ) = { (B1|A1), . . . , (Bn|An) } be the set of
conditionals in Ψ , and let κ◦ be the result of the descriptor revision of κ by Ψ .
Then this change satisfies the principle of conditional preservation with respect
to the conditionals in cond(Ψ) if and only if there are integers2 κ0, γ+i , γ−i ∈ Z,
1 6 i 6 n, such that:
κ◦(ω) = κ0 + κ(ω) +
∑
16i6n
ω|=AiBi
γ+i +
∑
16i6n
ω|=Ai∧¬Bi
γ−i (3)
The proof of Proposition 1 is directly obtainable from a proof given by Kern-
Isberner [19, Theorem 4.6.1], since no specific information on the success condition
for the conditionals in the descriptor was used in Proposition 1. The idea un-
derlying Proposition 1 is that interpretations that are verifying and falsifying
the same conditionals are treated in the same way. Thus, for every conditional
(Bi|Ai) ∈ cond(Ψ), the two constants γ+i and γ−i handle how interpretations are
shifted over the change process. The constant κ0 acts as a normalizer, ensuring
that κ◦ is indeed a ranking function, i.e. there is at least one world ω such that
κ◦(ω) = 0.
Example 6 (continued). Consider the change from κp to κ◦p, both given in Table
1. As shown in Example 5, this change satisfies the principle of conditional
preservation with respect to the conditionals in R = {(p|b), (f |p), (f |p)}. Indeed,
as stated in Proposition 1, we can obtain κ◦p from κp via Equation (3) by choosing
κ0 = 0, γ+1 = 0, γ−1 = −1, γ+2 = 0, γ−2 = 2, γ+3 = 0, and γ−3 = 0.
4.3 Descriptor Revision with Conditional Preservation
The principle of conditional preservation is a powerful basic principle of belief
change and it is natural to demand satisfaction of this principle. The principle
demands a specific relation between the conditionals in the prior belief state K,
the conditionals in the posterior state K◦ and the conditionals in the descriptor Ψ .
Remember that by Definition 3, a descriptor revision from K to K◦ is determined
2 As noted by Kern-Isberner [21], all κ0, γ+i , γ
−
i can be rational, but κ◦ has to satisfy
the requirements for OCF, in particular, all κ◦(ω) must be non-negative integers.
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by a choice function C, the descriptor Ψ and the set KK such that Equation (1)
holds, but none of these components allow to express a direct relation between
K, K◦ and Ψ . Thus, there is no possibility to express conditional preservation
by the means of descriptor revision. The principle of conditional preservation is
somewhat orthogonal to descriptor revision, which gives rationale to the following
definition of conditional descriptor revision.
Definition 5 (Conditional Descriptor Revision). Let κ be a ranking func-
tion. A descriptor revision of κ to κ◦ by a descriptor Ψ over Lcond (realised by
C over Kκ) is called a conditional descriptor revision of κ to κ◦ by Ψ (realised
by C over Kκ) if the change from κ to κ◦ satisfies the principle of conditional
preservation with respect to cond(Ψ).
In Definition 5, we choose ranking functions as representations for belief states,
but note that the principle of conditional preservation also applies to other
representations [20]. Thus, for other kinds of representations of belief states one
might give a definition of conditional descriptor revision similar to the one given
here. However, for the rest of the article, we focus on ranking functions. Moreover,
we assume Kκ to be the set of all ranking functions, i.e. when revising by a
descriptor over Ψ , we choose over the set of all ranking functions.
Example 7 (continued). Consider again κp to κ◦Ψ given in Table 1. The change
from κp to κ◦Ψ is a conditional descriptor revision by Ψ = {B(p|b),¬B(f |p),¬B(f |p)}.
Note that cond(Ψ) = {(p|b), (f |p), (f |p)}, and therefore, as stated in Example 5,
the change from κp to κ◦Ψ satisfies the principle of conditional preservation with
respect to cond(Ψ). Note that Ψ holds in κ◦p, i.e. κ◦p  Ψ . In particular, it is the
case that κ◦p  ¬B(f |p), which is equivalent to κ◦p 6|= (f |p), i.e. κ◦p(fp) 6< κ◦p(fp).
5 Characterisation of Conditional Descriptor Revision
with Elementary Descriptors by CSPs
The arithmetic nature of ranking functions and the characterisation of the
principle of conditional preservation by Proposition 1 allow us to give a constraint,
expressing the success condition of a literal descriptor.
Definition 6 (Constraint for literal descriptors, CRD(κ, α, Ψ)). Let κ be a
ranking function, let Ψ = {α1, . . . , αm} an elementary descriptor over Lcond with
cond(Ψ) = {(A1|B1), . . . , (An|Bn)}, and let α be a literal descriptor in Ψ . The
constraint for α in κ under Ψ , denoted by CRD(κ, α, Ψ), on the constraint variables
γ+1 , γ
−
1 , . . . , γ
+
n , γ
−
n ranging over Z, is given for a positive literal α = B(Bi|Ai)
descriptor by
γ−i − γ+i > ( min
ωAiBi
κ(ω) +
∑
j 6=i
ωAjBj
γ+j +
∑
j 6=i
ωAjB¯j
γ−j )
−( min
ωAiB¯i
κ(ω) +
∑
j 6=i
ωAjBj
γ+j +
∑
j 6=i
ωAjB¯j
γ−j ) for i = 1, . . . , n
(4)
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and for a negative literal descriptor α = ¬B(Bi|Ai) by
γ−i − γ+i 6 ( min
ωAiBi
κ(ω) +
∑
j 6=i
ωAjBj
γ+j +
∑
j 6=i
ωAjB¯j
γ−j )
−( min
ωAiB¯i
κ(ω) +
∑
j 6=i
ωAjBj
γ+j +
∑
j 6=i
ωAjB¯j
γ−j ) for i = 1, . . . , n.
(5)
The rationale for Definition 6 is that a positive literal descriptor {B(B|A)} holds
in the posterior state κ◦ if (B|A) is accepted by κ◦, more formally κ◦ |= (B|A), i.e.
κ◦(AB) < κ◦(AB). Likewise, a negative literal descriptor {¬B(B|A)} corresponds
to κ◦ 6|= (B|A), i.e. κ◦(AB) > κ◦(AB). The combining of all the constraints
obtained for each literal descriptor in Ψ yields a constraint satisfaction problem.
Definition 7 (CSP for elementary descriptors, CRD(κ, Ψ)). Let κ be a
ranking function and Ψ be an elementary belief descriptor with cond(Ψ) =
{(A1|B1), . . . , (An|Bn)}. The constraint satisfaction problem for κ and Ψ , on the
constraint variables γ+1 , γ−1 , . . . , γ+n , γ−n ranging over Z, denoted by CRD(κ, Ψ), is
given by the conjunction of the constraints CRD(κ, α, Ψ) for each α ∈ Ψ .
With Sol(CRD(κ, Ψ)), we denote the solutions of the constraint satisfaction
problem CRD(κ, Ψ). Each solution γ = 〈γ+1 , γ−1 , . . . , γ+n , γ−n 〉 ∈ Sol(CRD(κ, Ψ))
induces a unique ranking function κγ obtained from Equation (3) in Theorem 1
by choosing κ0 as the smallest integer such that the equation yields a ranking
function, i.e., there is a propositional interpretation ω ∈ Ω such that κγ(ω) = 0
and for all ω ∈ Ω the value κγ(ω) is a non-negative integer.
Example 8 (continued). Consider κp from Table 1 and the elementary descriptor
Ψ = {B(p|b),¬B(f |p),¬B(f |p)}. The CSP CRD(κ, Ψ) is given by:
CRD(κp,B(p|b), Ψ) : γ−1 − γ+1 >min{κp(bfp) + γ+2 +γ−3 , κp(bfp) + γ+3 + γ−2 }
−min{κp(bfp), κp(bfp))}
CRD(κp,¬B(f |p), Ψ) : γ−2 − γ+2 6min{κp(bfp) + γ+1 + γ−3 , κp(bfp) + γ−3 }
−min{κp(bfp) + γ+1 + γ+3 , κp(b fp)) + γ+3 }
CRD(κp,¬B(f |p), Ψ) : γ−3 − γ+3 6min{κp(bfp) + γ+1 + γ−2 , κp(b fp) + γ−2 }
−min{κp(bfp) + γ+1 + γ+2 , κp(bfp)) + γ+2 }
The vector γ = 〈γ+1 , γ−1 , γ+2 , γ−2 , γ+3 , γ−3 〉 with γ+1 = 0, γ−1 = −1, γ+2 = 0, γ−2 = 2,
γ+3 = 0, and γ−3 = 0 is a solution of Sol(CRD(κp, Ψ)), i.e. γ ∈ Sol(CRD(κp, Ψ)).
We obtain the ranking function κ◦p = κγ given in Table 1.
We examine whether our approach is sound and complete with respect to
conditional descriptor revision.
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Theorem 1 (Soundness of CRD(κ, Ψ)). Let κ be an ordinal conditional ranking
function, Ψ be an elementary belief descriptor, and let γ ∈ Sol(CRD(Ψ)). Then,
the change from κ to κγ is a conditional descriptor revision by Ψ (over all ranking
functions).
Note that a ranking function κ◦ is a c-representation [19] for a set of conditionals
R if and only if κ◦ is the result of a conditional descriptor revision starting form
a ranking function κ such that κ(ω) = 0 for every ω ∈ Ω with a descriptor
Ψ = {B(B|A) | (B|A) ∈ R}. The construction of a c-representation can be
characterised by a constraint-satisfaction problem similar to the one given in
Definition 7 [3, 19]. The soundness proof transfers to a proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 (Completeness of CRD(κ, Ψ)). Let Ψ be an elementary belief
descriptor and κ, κ◦ be ordinal conditional functions. If the change from κ to κ◦
is a conditional descriptor revision by Ψ (over all ranking functions), then there
exists an vector γ ∈ Sol(CRD(κ, Ψ)) such that κ◦ = κγ .
Proof (sketch). Because of Proposition 1, there exists κ0 and γ = 〈γ+1 , γ−1 , . . .〉
such that the ranking function κ◦ is representable as stated in Equation (3).
Therefore, we have κ◦ = κγ . It remains to show that γ ∈ Sol(CRD(κ, Ψ)). Note
that by our assumptions κ◦  α holds for each α ∈ Ψ . Suppose that α is a
positive literal descriptor, i.e. α = B(B|A), and thus, κ◦(AB) < κ◦(AB). By
employing Equation (3), we obtain Equation (4) from κ◦(AB) < κ◦(AB) by
algebraic transformations [19]. In an analogue way, one can obtain Equation (5)
from a negative literal descriptor. Note that these are exactly the inequalities in
CRD(κ, Ψ). Therefore, the vector γ is a solution for Sol(CRD(κ, Ψ)).
6 Implementation by ChangeOCF
We implemented descriptor revision for conditionals and elementary descriptors
under the principle of conditional preservation. Given a ranking function κ
and an elementary descriptor Ψ , our system, called ChangeOCF, calculates a
list of possible outcomes of a revision of κ with Ψ . To calculate the possible
outcomes of the revision, ChangeOCF uses a constraint system based on CRD(κ, Ψ)
introduced in Section 5. Following the Propositions 1 and 2, the solutions of this
constraint system correspond to the outcomes of a conditional descriptor revision.
A straightforward approach would be to solve CRD(κ, Ψ) for the given κ and
Ψ . Then, for each γ ∈ Sol(CRD(Ψ)) the corresponding ranking function κγ is
calculated.
In general, Sol(CRD(Ψ)) may contain infinite elements, but there is only a
finite number of equivalence classes with respect to the acceptance of conditionals.
Therefore, it is possible to restrict the set of solutions to finitely many without
losing interesting results. To do this, we used an approach inspired by maximal
impacts for c-representations [3] that addresses a similar problem for the enu-
meration of c-representations. The idea of maximal impacts is to add explicit
bounds for the value of each γ+i , γ−i . This reduces the set of possible solutions
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to a finite set, without losing equivalent solutions when choosing the bounds
appropriately. ChangeOCF limits the value of γ+1 , γ−1 , . . . , γ+n , γ−n to an individual
finite domain by extending the constraint system CRD(κ, Ψ) with constraints
umin−i 6 γ−i 6 umax−i and umin +i 6 γ+i 6 umax +i for 1 6 i 6 n. We denote
this extended constraint system by CRuD (κ, Ψ) with u = 〈umin−1 , umax−1 , umin +1 ,
umax +1 , . . . , u
max +
n 〉. Like for c-representations [22], it is an open problem which
values for u guarantee that a representative for each equivalence class of solutions
with respect to the acceptance of conditionals is found for a given κ and Ψ .
The implementation of ChangeOCF is build upon by InfOCF-Lib [23], a
Java library for reasoning with conditionals and ranking functions. InfOCF-Lib
calculates the c-representations of a conditional knowledge base by solving a
constraint system similar to CRuD (κ, Ψ). The interface of ChangeOCF is imple-
mented in Java. To solve CRuD (κ, Ψ), we use SICStus Prolog and its constraint
logic programming library for finite domains [7]. The Prolog implementation is
an adaption of the implementation of InfOCF [2] to the more general case of
belief change.
Example 9 (continued). Consider again the descriptor revision of κp from Table
1 with the elementary descriptor Ψ = {B(p|b),¬B(f |p),¬B(f |p)}. The corre-
sponding constraint satisfaction problem CRuD (κ, Ψ) is given by the conjunction
of CRD(κ, Ψ) from Example 8 with the following constraints:
umin−1 6 γ−1 6 umax−1 umin−2 6 γ−2 6 umax−1 umin−3 6 γ−3 6 umax−3
umin +1 6 γ+1 6 umax +1 umin +2 6 γ+2 6 umax +1 umin +3 6 γ+3 6 umax +3
If we choose for example u = 〈−2, 0, 0, 2,−1, 1,−1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0〉, there are nine
solutions to CRuD (κ, Ψ). One of the solutions is γ = 〈0, 2,−1, 0, 0, 0〉, which
corresponds to κγ = κ◦p from Table 1.
7 Summary and Future Work
In this article, we investigated descriptor revision for a conditional logic and
its realisation. We defined elementary descriptors, a large fragment of the full
descriptor language, allowing to express a multitude of different kind of changes
processes. In particular, elementary descriptors cover the success conditions of
AGM revision and AGM contraction. We introduced conditional descriptor re-
vision, which is an extension of descriptor revision for conditionals obeying the
principle of conditional preservation by Kern-Isberner. We gave a characterisa-
tion by a constraint satisfaction problem and an implementation of conditional
descriptor revision with elementary descriptors was presented.
For future work, we plan to give a characterisation of conditional descriptor
revision with descriptors with disjunction. This requires a more fine-grained
handling of the interaction of the constraints, and might require transformations
of a descriptor into a normal form. Another open problem is the determination
of maximal impacts for the constraint problem such that all solutions up to
equivalence with respect to acceptance of conditionals are captured.
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